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Abstract 
 
When educational policy is supplemented by a redistributive income tax, and when individuals 
differ in their ability to benefit from education, the optimal policy is typically rather regressive. 
Resources are concentrated on the most able individuals in order to get a "cake" as big as 
possible to share among individuals through income taxation. In this paper we put forward 
another reason to push for regressive education. It is not linked to heterogeneity in innate ability 
to benefit from education but to pervasive non-convexities that arise in the optimal income tax 
problem when individual productivities are endogenous. For simplicity we assume a linear 
education technology and a given total education budget. To give the equal wage outcome the 
best chance to emerge, we also assume that individuals have identical learning abilities. 
Nevertheless, it turns out that in the first-best wage inequality is always preferable to wage 
equality. Even more surprisingly, this conclusion remains valid in the second-best (unless ad 
hoc restriction on the feasible degree of a wage differentiation are imposed). This is in spite of 
the fact that wage equalization would eliminate any need for distortionary income taxation. 
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1 Introduction
One of the main rationales for public involvement in education is redistribution.
In the literature, the design of an optimal educational policy is usually com-
bined with that of a redistributive income tax. In that framework education is
not the only channel of redistribution; there is also in a second stage an income
tax that can alter social welfare. The government’s problem is first to determine
the amount and distribution of public education and then to design the structure
of the income tax. The standard approach is to assume a population of indi-
viduals who differ in their ability to benefit from education. This heterogeneity
typically implies a rather regressive distribution of public education: resources are
concentrated on the most able individuals in order to get a “cake” as big as pos-
sible to share among individuals through income taxation; see e.g., Bruno (1976),
Hare and Ulph (1979) and Ulph (1977). Note that this “perverse” distribution
effect just mentioned is partially mitigated when we introduce decreasing returns
of educational spending.1Naturally, if we restrict the exercise to the first stage,
the solution is also different and tends to be less regressive. This is shown for
instance by Arrow (1971) who studies the optimal distribution of a given amount
of public expenditure among individuals differing in their learning ability without
accounting for the possibility of subsequent income redistribution.
In this paper we put forward another reason to push for regressive education.
It is not linked to heterogeneity in innate ability to benefit from education but
to pervasive non-convexities that arise in the optimal income tax problem when
individual productivities are endogenous (depend on education). This point has
been neglected so far.2 To make it as clear as possible, we assume away differences
in learning abilities, decreasing returns of education and we suppose that the
total amount of public expenditure on education is given. We shall discuss the
implications of those three assumptions in the concluding section.
1Bovenberg and Jacobs (2005) and Maldonado (2007).
2Note however that it is implicitly acknowledged by Bovenberg and Jacobs (2005) who avoid
it by making suitable assumptions on the education technology.
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We show that when the general redistributive framework includes an education
policy that determines the distribution of wage and an optimal income tax à la
Mirrlees, then the most unequal distribution of wage happens to be desirable from
the standpoint of social welfare maximization. In other words, in our setting, it
is “more efficient” to redistribute income rather than to equalize wages.
This rather surprising and to some extent counter-intuitive result has to be
interpreted with great care. It does have practical relevance because the effects
that are at work in our simple setting (and the push for a corner solution) are
also going to be relevant in much more complex (and realistic) frameworks. Con-
sequently, the advocates of a progressive education policy have to show that there
are benefits to wage equalization that outweigh the non-convexities we are putting
forward. We shall revisit this issue in the concluding section. In the meantime
let us just point out that our result is clearly at odds with the literature on equal
opportunity that would recommend wage equality.3 In fact, we here have a trade-
off between equal opportunity and utilitarian welfare maximization. It is also at
odds with the observation that in many countries public spending in education,
but also in health is more redistributive than income taxation. If such an observa-
tion is correct and if it is seen from the perspective of our results it suggests that
effective income taxation is far from being optimal.
To keep our arguments as simple as possible, we use the two-ability version of
Mirrlees (1972)’s model by Stiglitz (1982). Stiglitz studies the optimal income tax
schedule where there is a fraction ni of workers with productivity wi (i = 1, 2).
Traditionally, both (n1, n2) on the one hand and (w1, w2) are given. The only
restriction is that w2 > w1. Recently there has been some attempts to study the
incidence of a change in n1/n2 over the optimal tax schedule and the extent of
redistribution.4 Yet there exist no study on the incidence of a change in w1 and
w2.
Suppose now that through its educational policy the government can choose
3Romer (1998), Athanasiou (2007).
4Boadway and Pestieau (2007).
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the vector (w1, w2) subject to some constraint n1w1 + n2w2 = a (constant to be
specified below). This amounts to assuming that wages are determined by ed-
ucation expenditures through a linear technology and that the total education
budget is given. The natural question to ask is what is the most desirable dis-
tribution of (w1, w2) given that whatever the vector (w1, w2) chosen there will be
some redistributive taxation policy. At first glance, one is tempted to lean towards
equal wages, w1 = w2. This appears to be the most “natural” solution at least
with a concave social welfare function (when society cares for equality). Further-
more with equal wages, there is no need to resort to distortionary taxation to
redistribute incomes. Consequently, a first-best policy is attainable.
We show in this paper that such an intuitive thinking is wrong and that the
optimal distribution of abilities is the most unequal one. In the first-best, one easily
shows that with quasi linear preferences individual utility is a convex function of
w so that the equal wages solution is a local social welfare minimum. By endowing
one type of individual with maximum ability we get more aggregate utility than
by endowing both types with average ability. Second-order conditions are more
complicated with general preferences but we provide a simple argument to show
that wage differentiation always dominates wages equalization. All these results
are obtained in a first-best setting, when there is no asymmetric information that
hinders income distribution. When wages are not observable in the second stage
one would expect the case for equal wages to be considerably strengthened. Quite
surprisingly this turns out no to be the case. Specifically, we show that in a second-
best setting, the most unequal distribution of productivity remains desirable if it
implies zero productivity for all but one type. It is only when there is a positive
“productivity floor” (implying an exogenous limit to wage differentiation), that an
equal distribution of productivity may become desirable in a second-best setting.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. After introducing the basic
model, we first deal with the first-best setting (Section 3) and then with the
second best-one (Section 4). In Section 5, we present a numerical example.
3
2 The economy
In the line of Stiglitz (1982) we consider two types of individuals i = 1, 2 with
relative size ni > 0 (so that n1 + n2 = 1) and identical utilities
ui (xi, ci) , (1)
where xi is consumption of a numeraire good and ci labor supply. Productivities
(or wages) wi are endogenous and satisfy what we call the educational technology.
We characterize this technology through Γ the set of feasible wages that is defined
by
Γ = {(w1, w2)|n1w1 + n2w2 = 2 and wi ≥ w} with 1 ≥ w ≥ 0. (2)
In words we have a linear technology according to which earnings ability can be
“transferred” between types on a one by one basis. To understand this formulation
assume first that w = 0. In that case the education technology has two extreme
cases. One is the complete equalization of wages w1 = w2 = 1 and the other is the
maximum wage inequality with say w1 = 0 and w2 = 1/n2 where all educational
resources are devoted to type 2 individuals. The role of w is to limit the scope of
wages inequalities that is feasible.
We specify the education technology in terms of wages to make the link to
the optimal taxation literature. The formalization we use may appear somewhat
unusual, but can be derived from a more conventional specification of the edu-
cation technologies as it is often found in the literature. Following Ulph (1977)
we can specify individual wages as wi = φi(θi, ei), where θi is (exogenous) abil-
ity to benefit from educations and ei is education expenditure. This is exactly
equivalent to the technology we use if (i) individuals are identical ex ante (θi is
the same for all), (ii) φ is linear in ei (for instance wi = Aei where A is some
constant) and (iii) the total budget for education expenditures is fixed at E (so
that n1e1 + n2e2 = E).5
5For instance, we would have w1 = θ1eα and w2 = θ2eα2 where θ1 6= θ2 reflects different
learning ability and α ≤ 1 implies decreasing returns. In our paper e1 + e2 = 2, α = 1 and
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To evaluate welfare, we adopt a symmetric social criterion:
W =
X
niψ (ui) ,
where ψ (·) is concave. An extreme form of ψ (·) yields the Rawlsian criterion:
W = min [u1, u2] .
For the remainder of the paper we assume for notational convenience and without
loss of generality that n1 = n2 = 1/2.
3 First-best
3.1 General problem: statement
Assume full information and free use of lump-sum transfers. The optimal alloca-
tion is then determined by solving:
max
ci,wi,Ti
W = Ψ[u(w1c1 − T1, c1)] +Ψ[u(w2c2 − T2, c2)], (3)
s.t. w1 + w2 = 2, (4)
T1 + T2 = 0 (5)
wi ≥ w. (6)
This is similar to the standard first-best benchmark considered by Stiglitz (1982),
except that we have endogenous wages. We concentrate on the first-order condi-
tion with respect to wi. Substituting for w2 = 2− w1 and differentiating yields
∂W
∂w1
= (c1 − c2)λ,
where λ > 0 is the Lagrange multiplier of the resource constraint (5). This FOC
is always satisfied for w1 = w2 = 1 (along with c1 = c2) so that one might be
tempted to think that the solution implies equalization of wages. However, we
cannot simply assume that the SOC to be satisfied here. The SOCs condition for
the general problem (with 6 decision variables) is complicated but the potential
for nonconvexities can be illustrated by considering a special case.
θ1 = θ2 = 1. To be more precise, this specification yields (2) with w = 0. To generate a positive
level of w we would have to add a constraint specifying a minimum level of ei.
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3.2 Quasi-linear illustration
Assume quasi-linear preferences specified by ui (xi, ci) = xi − v(ci). With such
preferences it is plain that Pareto efficiency requires the maximization of “surplus”
given by
S = w1c1 + w2c2 − v(c1)− v(c2).
Furthermore individual labor supplies ci can be expressed solely as a function of
wi (there is no income effect). Substituting w2 = 2 − w1 we then reduce the
problem to a single dimension and write eS(w1). Differentiating yields
deS
dw1
= c1(w1)− c2(2− w1), (7)
d2 eS
dw21
=
dc1
dw1
+
dc2
dw2
> 0, (8)
which shows that eS(w1) is a convex function convex. Consequently, with quasi-
linear preferences equalization of wages is never optimal. Instead, we have a
corner solution which involves “maximum differentiation”. Specifically, when it
is feasible (i.e, when w = 0) one individual will have a zero wage (and not work
at all) while the other one will have a positive wage (namely wi = 2) and labor
supply. When w > 0, this extreme solution is not feasible. However, it continues
to be true that wages ought to be differentiated as much as possible.
To sum up, the maximal wage differentiation maximizes the size of total surplus
and thus applies at all Pareto efficient allocations. When Ψ is strictly concave,
social welfare is maximized when utilities are equalized. This is achieved through
lump-sump transfers. Recall that we are in a first-best world for the time being
so that redistribution (of incomes) does not involve any efficiency loss.
3.3 General problem: solution
With general preferences we can no longer reduce the problem to a single dimen-
sion and the SOCs are too complicated to be conclusive. However, we can use a
different approach and directly compare the relevant levels of welfare, namelyW I
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(achieved when w1 = w2 = 1) and WC (achieved when, say, w1 = (2 − w) and
w2 = w), and show that WC ≥W I so that maximum differentiation continues to
dominate even with general preferences).
To see this, define the level of labor supply under wage (and consumption)
equalization
cI = argmax
c
Ψ [u (c, c)] +Ψ [u (c, c)] . (9)
Maximum welfare is then given by
W I = Ψ
£
u
¡
cI , cI
¢¤
+Ψ
£
u
¡
cI , cI
¢¤
. (10)
At a corner solution with w1 = (2−w) and w2 = w, maximum welfare is given
by
WC = max
c1,c2,T
Ψ [u (w1c1 − T, c1)] +Ψ [u (w2 + T, c2)] (11)
where T is a lump-sum transfer. By setting T to equalize consumption levels
(which is generally not the optimal level)6 we obtain
WC ≥ max
c1,c2
Ψ
∙
u
µ
w1c1 + w2c2
2
, c1
¶¸
+Ψ
∙
u
µ
w1c1 + w2c2
2
, c2
¶¸
.
By setting c1 = c2 = cI (which is again generally not optimal) and using w1 =
(2− w) and w2 = w we then obtain
WC ≥ Ψ
£
u
¡
cI , cI
¢¤
+Ψ
£
u
¡
cI , cI
¢¤
=W I .
Consequently, the corner solution dominates because for w1 = (2−w) and w2 = w
there are feasible choices of labor supplies and transfer which yield (at least) the
same level of welfare as under wage equalization.
To sum up, we have the following proposition
Proposition 1 Assume that preferences are represented by ui (xi, ci) and that
wages can be chosen according to w1 + w2 = 2, with wi ≥ w. When individual
types are observable (so that personalized lump-sum transfers are available), the
6Unless for instance Ψ is linear while u is strongly separable.
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level of welfare achieved under maximum wage differentiation (with wi = w and
wj = 2− w) is always at least as high as (and generally higher than) the level of
welfare achieved under wage equalization (with w1 = w2 = 1).
In words, in a first-best setting, equalization of wages (according to the linear
technology considered here) is at best useless and generally yields a reduction
in welfare. Roughly speaking, the best strategy is thus to redistribute incomes
rather than abilities. Recall that with the linear education technology considered,
redistribution of abilities does not involve any efficiency loss per se (the total cake
does not become smaller). Yet, it proves not to be desirable.
Even though this result may at first seem surprising, the intuition becomes
obvious under closer scrutiny. Consider the simplest case with w = 0. Then if
we go from equal wages to way w2 = 2, individual 2’s wage is effectively doubled.
This means that we can produce the same output as under equal wages by having
only one individual work. The proof of Proposition 1 is constructed around this
argument (which becomes slightly more complicated when w > 0).
4 The second-best
So far we have assumed full information under which redistribution of incomes
through lump-sum taxes and transfers is possible and does not involve any effi-
ciency loss (we move along the Pareto frontier). We now turn to a setting of sym-
metric information and assume that only income yi = wici is publicly observable,
while wages and labor supplies are private information. This is the information
structure on which most of the optimal tax literature is based. In this setting the
case for equalization of wages appears to be considerably strengthened. Specif-
ically, when wages are equalized, distortionary redistribution of incomes is not
needed. Conversely, the maximal wage differentiation may, as shown in the previ-
ous section, yield a bigger “cake”, but it is not clear if it remains bigger once the
efficiency losses of income redistribution are incurred.
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Quite surprisingly, when w = 0, maximal wage differentiation continues to
dominate even in a second-best setting. We show this through two propositions.
The first one is of limited scope and applies only to some classes of utility functions.
However, it provides some interesting intuition. The second one applies to all
utility functions but is established in a more indirect way.
To specify the second-best problem, we can start from the first-best problem,
(3)—(6) to which we have to add the following two incentive constraints
u (xi, ci) ≥ u(xj, ecj) i, j = 1, 2; i 6= j,
where ecj = wjcj/wi is the labor supply of individual i mimicking individual j.
Observe that when wjcj > 0, ecj is only defined if wi > 0. An individual with zero
wage can never mimick an individual with positive wage (and labor supply).
Now, assume w = 0 and consider an allocation with maximum wage differen-
tiation and say w1 = 0 and w2 = 2. Assume for the time being that the first-best
allocation (solution to (3)—(6)) implies
u (x2, c2) ≥ u(x1, 0) (12)
so that the productive individual (who works) has a utility level that is at least as
high as that of the non productive individual (who does not work). In that case it
is plain that the first-best solution is also the second-best solution. Put differently,
the full information optimum remains implementable under asymmetric informa-
tion. To see this note that (12) implies that the incentive constraint of type 2
individuals is satisfied because with w1 = 0 we have ec2 = c1 = 0.7 Furthermore
with w1 = 0 type 1 individuals cannot mimick type 2 individuals. We thus have
the following proposition:
Proposition 2 Assume w = 0.When the first-best solution with wi = 0 and wj =
2 (i, j = 1, 2; i 6= j) implies u (xj, cj) ≥ u(xi, 0), then it can also be implemented
if individual incomes are observable while wages and labor supplies are not.
7This is no longer true when w > 0.
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This proposition applies to a number of interesting settings. In particular, it
holds for the Rawlsian welfare function or with quasi linear preferences when Ψ is
linear (simple utilitarian criterion). However, there are also many instances where
it does not apply. A prominent and well known example is the case of separable
preferences u(x, c) = f(x) − g(c), where the first-best implies x1 = x2 so that
(12) is violated under maximum wage differentiation (the productive individual is
worse off than the unproductive individual).
When Proposition 2 applies, the first-best solution can be implemented in the
second-best. Consequently first and second best solutions coincide (and both im-
ply maximum wage differentiation). When (12) is violated, the first-best solution
can no longer be implemented in the second best. However, as long as w = 0 we
can show that maximum wage differentiation continues to dominate the solution
with equal wages.
Recall that with equal wages the best solution is achieved with xi = ci = cI ,
where cI is defined by (9). Since individuals are treated identically this is both a
first- and a second best solution. Now consider again an allocation with maximum
wage differentiation and say w1 = 0 and w2 = 2. Set c2 = cI and define bT such
that
u(bT , 0) = u(cI , cI). (13)
Observe that T < cI (utility being decreasing in c). It is then easy to verify
that the allocation defined by x1 = bT , c1 = 0, x2 = 2cI − bT and c2 = cI , is
feasible, Pareto dominates the equal wage solution xi = ci = cI and is incentive
compatible. Pareto dominance follows from (13) for individual 1. For individual
2, bT < cI implies
u(x2, c2) = u(2cI − bT , cI) > u(cI , cI). (14)
Finally, combining (13) and (14) yields
u(x2, c2) > u(bT , 0),
which implies incentive compatibility.8 To sum up, we have established the fol-
8To establish (14) one needs w2 = 2 and thus w1 = 0.
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lowing proposition
Proposition 3 Assume w = 0. Under maximum wages differentiation with wi =
0 and wj = 2 (i, j = 1, 2; i 6= j) there exists a feasible allocation defined by xi = bT ,
ci = 0, xj = 2cI− bT and cj = cI (where bT satisfies u(bT , 0) = u(cI , cI)) that Pareto
dominates the best equal wage solution (xi = ci = cI), and is incentive compatible.
The allocation we have constructed to establish this proposition is of course
in general not the optimal one but this can only strengthen the case against wage
equalization.
To sum up, as long as w = 0, wage equalization is never optimal, even in
the second-best (i.e., even when it makes potentially costly ex post redistribution
unnecessary. However, it is also clear that the assumption w = 0 plays a crucial
role in the proofs to both propositions. This does not mean that the (second- best)
results are reversed as soon as w > 0. However, the dominance of maximum wage
differentiation can then no longer be established at the same level of generality;
we then can no longer rule out that wage equalization may be optimal in some
situation. To illustrate this point we now turn to a numerical example.
5 Numerical example
To illustrate the argument at hand we use a quadratic disutility for labor so that
in the laissez-faire:
ui = wici − c2i /2 = w2i /2.
With such a specification we can represent social indifference curves in the plane
(w1, w2). Using a utilitarian social welfare function, we have:
S =
w21
2
+
w22
2
.
Consequently, social indifference curves are quarter circles as represented in Figure
1. When w1 + w2 = 2, we reach the same level S = 2 with (w1, w2) = (2, 0) or
11
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Figure 1: Illustration with quasi linear preferences and quadratic disutility of
labor.
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(0, 2), while wage equalization w1 = w2 = 1 yields S = 1.(a local minimum).
To achieve S = 2 under wage equalization one would need (w1, w2) =
¡√
2,
√
2
¢
,
which implies w1 + w2 = 2
√
2 > 2. Consequently, to reach the same welfare with
equal wages as with unequal wage distribution and lump-sum taxes, we need a
larger total level of human capital.9
The level of (per capita) welfare as a function of w2, with w1 = 2−w2 over the
range [1, 2] is represented on Figure 2. Not surprisingly this curve is monotonically
increasing. Thus, whatever the level of w the first-best solution always implies
maximum wage differentiation. But of course this only confirms our theoretical
results from Section 3.
We now turn to the second-best optimum. To tackle this problem we maximize
(utilitarian) welfare for a given level of w2, with w1 = 2−w2, subject to resource
and self selection constraints. The resulting level of welfare is represented on
Figure 2. Not surprisingly first- and second-best coincide for w1 = w2 = 1. From
Proposition 2 we also expect them to coincide in the neighborhood of w2 = 2 (i.e.,
w1 = 0). The really interesting feature about this welfare profile is that the curve
is not monotonic. This means that while a large wage differential (when allowed
by the level of w) is always better than wage equalization, small wage differentials
may not be second-best optimal. In other words, when w is large enough (more
than roughly 0.8 in the example) wage equalization is effectively the second-best
solution (and dominates w1 = w and w2 = 2 − w). The orders of magnitude
are of course of no relevance here but the illustration is sufficient to provide a
counterexample and to show that a second-best solution with wage equalization
can effectively arise.
Let us finally turn to the intuition behind this result. In the second-best,
differentiating wages has two (contradictory) effects. First it is efficiency enhanc-
ing. This is shown by the fact the first best level of welfare is increasing in w2.
However, it also brings in an informational problem (unobservable types and the
9A larger level of “total” human captial with equal wage than under unequal wages would
be possible with decreasing returns to education. See the concluding section.
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Figure 2: Welfare as a function of w2, with w1 = 2 − w2 at the first best (solid
curve) and the second-best (dotted curve) solutions.
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need for distortionary taxation). Interestingly this curve is also convex which
mean that there are “increasing returns” to wage differentiation. Even though
the shape of the curve is example specific, it is not surprising; recall the intuition
behind Proposition 1 presented in Section 3. Because of these increasing returns
the efficiency gain associated with a small wage differentiation is not sufficient to
compensate for the adverse informational impact. However, a large degree of dif-
ferentiation yields efficiency gains that outweigh the negative effects of information
asymmetries.
6 Conclusion
When the productivities of otherwise identical individuals can be controlled thr-
ough education expenses and when no subsequent redistribution through income
taxation is available, it is clear the equal wage solution is very compelling. The
question raised in this paper is different. We have studied the optimal distribu-
tion of productivity under the assumption that redistribution through an optimal
income tax is also available. To give the equal wage outcome the best chance to
emerge, we have assumed that individuals have identical learning abilities. Never-
theless, it turns out that in the first-best inequality is always preferable to equality.
In the second-best this conclusion has to be qualified. It only holds if the lower
limit on productivity is not to high. Either way, the underlying problem is in-
herently non convex and a simple inspection of first-order conditions can be very
misleading.
Admittedly, our model is at odds with most models of education. We assume
that all individuals are ex ante identical; we also assume away the idea that ed-
ucational spending has decreasing returns and the fact that the total amount of
expenditure is endogenous. Let us see what would be the implications of relax-
ing these three assumptions. Making educational spending endogenous (and not
equal to 2) would not change the main result. Decreasing returns could make a
difference. Assume for the sake of illustration that instead of w1+w2 = 2 we have
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max (w1, w2) = 2, then it is clear that social optimality would imply w1 = w2;
see Figure 1. This illustration also makes it clear that the degree of decreasing
returns to scale must be sufficiently strong to reverse our result. When the set of
feasible wages is convex but with a frontier sufficiently close to the line represent-
ing w1 +w2 = 2 wages differentiation continues to be optimal. Roughly speaking
the result is only reversed if the degree of concavity of the wage frontier is so large
that its intersection with the 45 degree line is above the point (
√
2,
√
2). Finally,
there is the assumption of uniform learning ability. If we were to assume different
learning ability, then our results could only be strengthened. The main difference
is that the individual with the higher wage level would be the more able.
To sum up, the somehow surprising result obtained in this paper is not just a
technical curiosity, but would continue to hold in a more general class of setting.
This calls for a number of remarks. First, it means that for people who are only
concerned by the maximization of utilitarian social welfare the concept of “equality
of opportunity”, defined as equality of earning capacity, might be undesirable.
Second, one may find unsatisfactory a society that achieves full equality of
utilities, but consist of a majority of individuals without education. If we think
that education brings utility by itself and thus should be explicitly introduced in
the utility function, our conclusion would be different. Finally, we have to keep
in mind that for reasons pertaining to political economy redistribution through
education may be easier than tax redistribution.
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